US-Sudan ties: The Darfur dilemma

US-Sudan ties: The Darfur dilemma

Obama's new policy of "carrots along with sticks" towards Sudan has drawn ridicule and derision both on the part of some humanitarian organizations and mainstream US media. "Naive" is the term most widely used by those critics to describe Obama's special envoy to Sudan Scott Gration.

While the Sudanese doubt the possibility of any major change in US policies towards Sudan, western critics of the new policy doubt if there will be any major change in the Sudanese government's behaviour with regard to the conflict in Darfur in particular. They believe the US government has decided to reward the regime in Khartoum with incentives in exchange for empty promises from that regime.

Under the title "Sudan, Dialogue Has Limits", The Boston Globe website wrote in this respect: 

"In other instances, President Obama’s penchant for engaging in dialogue with nasty regimes may prove savvy. In the case of Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, it is all too likely that engagement will end up looking naive ... the chances Bashir will accommodate Obama’s good intentions are closer to none than slim."

Even before the announcement of the new policy, as word spread of what direction it would take, Western journalists with a special focus on Darfur expressed deep reservation. For instance, this is what Eric Reeves under the title ' The Phony Optimism in Darfur" had written as early as August 6 this year:

"In Senate testimony last week, US special presidential envoy for Sudan Scott Gration offered a peculiarly upbeat assessment of the crisis in Darfur and the prospects for peace throughout Sudan. He argued that we should move toward normalizing relations with the regime in Khartoum, including lifting sanctions and removing Sudan from the State Department list of terrorist-sponsoring nations. This would be a grave mistake—and would reward, at precisely the wrong moment, a regime comprising the very men who have orchestrated genocide in Darfur and continue to renege on key elements of the 2005 north/south peace agreement."

All this is putting Obama's policy to a critical test. If it doesn't deliver in the short term, pressure groups within the Democratic party may find their usual tough line on Sudan vindicated once again and Obama will be pressured to act using the stick not the carrot.

The issue, though, is that no amount of cooperation from the Sudanese government will solve the problems in Darfur as long as the rebel groups or some of their main factions like SLA-Abdul Wahid are not willing to talk.

Khartoum believes that the first step that Obama should take is to convince Abdul Wahid, as well as the Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim, to hold real dialogue for peace and to show a certain flexiblity in their approach. Without this happening, Khartoum will never be able to end the situation of the Darfur displaced and refugees. Nor will it be able to put an end to clashes with the rebels, which cause casualties among civilians.

This of course does not absolve Khartoum of its responsibilities in the plight of those civilians but it shows that the situation is much more complex than in the simplistic manner in which it is presented in Western media.

It's not just Khartoum killing civilians in Darfur, it's also about a fractured rebellion that's both unwilling to talk and unable to unite its endlessly splintered factions under one broad banner in order to be able to make peace with Khartoum.