The top US general in Afghanistan has been kept away from the media, but they already know what he would say if asked some key questions about the war effort.
The Commander of NATO and US troops, General Stanley McChrystal is being kept away from the media. He is making no comment as he awaits the final decision on troops numbers from President Obama, due to be announced on December 1. But we already know how he would answer some of the key questions preoccupying insiders in Washington DC.
Are US and NATO forces losing in Afghanistan?
McCHRYSTAL: The stakes in Afghanistan are high. The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted.
Many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.
How critical will the coming months be?
McCHRYSTAL: This is a unique moment in time. This is an important – and likely decisive – period of the war. Afghans are frustrated and weary after eight years without evidence of the progress they anticipated. Patience is understandably short, both in Afghanistan and in our own countries.
The short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (the next 12 months) – while Afghan security capacity matures – risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.
Do you need extra forces?
McCHRYSTAL: Additional force is required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.
It must be made clear new resources are not the crux. To succeed, ISAF requires a new approach – with a magnitude of change – in addition to a proper level of resourcing. This is a different kind of fight.
Explain to me how you will do things differently?
McCHRYSTAL: Focus on the Population. Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent in coalition warfare.
Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect. We must interact more closely with the population, and focus on operations that bring stability. We must significantly modify our organisational structures to achieve better unity of effort.
What if you do not get the extra troops and resources you have asked for?
McCHRYSTAL: Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency – historically a recipe for failure in COIN. ISAF requires a properly-resourced force and capability level to correct this deficiency. Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.
Why not keep training the Afghan army and police and let them do the job?
McCHRYSTAL: Ideally the ANSF must lead this fight, but they will not have enough capacity in the near-term given the insurgency’s growth rate. The status quo will lead to failure if we wait for the ANSF to grow.
How serious is the problem of corruption?
McCHRYSTAL: Widespread corruption and abuse of power exacerbate the popular crisis of confidence in the government and reinforce a culture of impunity. Local afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through direct elections and judicial processes. Further, the public perceives ISAF complicit in these matters, and that there is no appetite or capacity – either among the internationals or within GIRoA – to correct the situation.
Afghanistan is known as the "graveyard of empires". There are a growing number of people in US and Europe who say the country is ungovernable. What do you say to them?
McCHRYSTAL: The popular myth that Afghans do not want governance is overplayed – while Afghan society is rooted in tribal structures and ethnic identities, Afghans do have a sense of national identity.
The complex social landscape of Afghanistan is in many ways much more difficult to understand than Afghanistan’s enemies. ISAF has not sufficiently studied Afghanistan’s peoples whose needs, identities, and grievances vary from province to province and from valley to valley.
How do I know what the General would say in answer to these questions? These are all real quotes, taken from the Initial Assessment by General McChrystal completed on the August 30, 2009 and later leaked to the Washington Post.
Of course, some of the above answers need decoding, because they include jargon or MILSPEAK:
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force – the NATO-led, UN-mandated force in Afghanistan.
GIRoA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
COIN – Counterinsurgency.
I am told General McChrystal will continue to avoid interaction with the media once Obama has made his speech. That’s because he will be flown to Washington DC next week to explain his strategy to key congressional committees.
One NATO source told me the General feels a level of frustration about having to keep silent for the last few months. He feels an important part of his job is public diplomacy, trying to explain the mission of ISAF to the Afghan people. One member of the military public affairs team told me: "He is our best spokesman."
