Iran's unambiguous ambiguity

Iran's unambiguous ambiguity

"What is Iran hiding?" asked Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, rhetorically.

It is, she concluded on the basis of "mounting evidence" - read circumstantial evidence - developing "nuclear weapons" and that is not acceptable to the US.

True, Iran is not coming clean on its intentions over its nuclear programme. Rather it is doing the absolute minimum under its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations to underline how its nuclear programme is civilian in nature, when UN resolutions and mounting suspicion require more.

But states are in the business of hiding their intentions, especially concerning national security and sovereignty. If they were forthcoming and transparent, intelligence services would not exist.

Actually, Tehran is managing a sensitive, even dangerous balancing act. It reveals the minimum required by its international obligations while making bombastic statements about its breakthroughs in nuclear enrichment.

As it tries to please the IAEA as an accountable member of the international community, it annoys, even embarrasses, the US and its European partners to please its nationalistic popular base.

Nuclear made unclear

Why would Iran go through the trouble and risk of igniting stiffer sanctions and possible military attack?

Arguably because it reckons that is the best way to safeguard its national sovereignty and strategic deterrence in a region dominated by a US and Western military presence.

Iraq, if we care to remember, was also ambiguous about its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme prior to the 2003 US-led invasion.

As the regime of Saddam Hussein complied with related international resolutions and destroyed all traces of whatever WMD programme (imagined or real) it had, it continued its political posturing just as it maintained its ambiguous military posture.

After his capture, Saddam Hussein told his US jailors that Baghdad did not come clean because the regime was concerned with maintaining a minimum deterrence towards Tehran. The same applied to Washington.

The Iranian regime which stood silent, even complicit, as the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, in the hope of gaining favour and influence, found itself vulnerable after 2004 when the Bush administration went wild in its crusade to transform the region's politics and stood by Israel as it invaded South Lebanon in 2006 to take on Tehran's ally, Hezbollah.

Remember in 2007, the most authoritative arm of the US government on the subject, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), concluded with "high confidence" that "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme".

What is Washington hiding?

Today, as the Obama administration escalates its war in Afghanistan, redeploys in and out of Iraq, and appeases Israel, Tehran is making sure that its security is not discounted and its interests are not taken for granted.

President Obama is well aware of Tehran's strategic anxiety and its search for strategic accommodation with Washington.

Which explains why, only a few weeks after taking office, Obama spoke directly to the 'great Iranian nation' on the occasion of Nowruz - the Persian new year - of 'extending a hand to Tehran if it unclenched its fist'.

He also promised a new approach driven by pragmatism, not ideology, and on the basis of "mutual interest and mutual respect". He later approved direct negotiations with Iran - the first since 1979.

But the Iranians have rejected America's demand that talks be limited to their nuclear programme, especially when that is the domain of the IAEA, not the US and its NATO allies.

If Washington's agenda is nuclear, Tehran's agenda is national security and its future role in the region.

That is why it is disingenuous of the US secretary of state to claim that Iran refuses to sit down with Washington, and neglects to mention how Washington will not sit down with Iran to discuss the latter's regional concerns.

With its neighbours to the north and south - Iraq and Afghanistan - occupied by the US and as it is threatened by Israel, Tehran demands explicit recognition of Iran's regional status and long-term US commitments and assurances.

Which begs the question: Is the Obama administration ready to discuss Iran's vision of the region or to recognise Iran's regional power with all that it invokes in Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Cairo?

Judging from the ongoing US diplomatic offensive, that is not likely for now.

Back to the future

Instead, Washington has pursued three possible alternatives: Charm/conciliation, coercion/sanctions and regime change/war.

Since the charm offensive failed to slow down Iran's uranium enrichment, let alone stop it or tone down the bombastic rhetoric, the Obama administration is moving towards the second option: Sanctions and isolation.

Its first signs were revealed on the eve of Obama's visit to China last November. He reportedly dispatched special Middle East envoy Dennis Ross to explain to the Chinese the logic behind US pressure on Iran and the danger of the alternative scenarios, such as an Israeli military operation against the Iranian nuclear programme.

Since then attempts at imposing new sanctions have grown more urgent.

Naval US deployments to the Gulf to 'defend' its allies from possible Iranian missile attack (!), through to Clinton's visit this week to enlist the support of Washington's Arab and Turkish allies, are escalating US diplomatic pressure on Iran and signal a dramatic shift in US policy despite continued hesitation, even aversion, to its new position from its interlocutors.

If sanctions do not force the increasingly "military dictatorship" to give up its nuclear enrichment, to use Clinton's words, Washington hopes Iran will implode from within in light of the potent opposition to the regime, saving America the trouble of waging another war in the Muslim world.

I expect Obama, who vowed to deny Iran nuclear weapons at any cost, to focus US efforts on sanctions and coercion in order to diminish Tehran's leverage as it bargains over its nuclear programme.

As for the war option, it will remain on the table to intimidate Iran and to tame the reservations and outright objections from friend and foe alike.